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SHAPING NUCLEAR WASTE POLICY AT 
THE JUNCTURE OF FEDERAL AND STATE 
LAW 
LAWRENCE FLINT* 
Abstract: Nuclear waste has long been the Achilles' heel of the civilian 
nuclear power industry. The spent nuclear fuel that reactors generate 
remains radioactive for hundreds of thousands of years, however, all the 
spent fuel that has been generated to date is stored in temporary, short-
term facilities. As the federal government struggles to develop a 
permanent solution, many temporary storage facilities are nearing 
capacity. A few states in which civilian reactors are located have placed 
severe constraints on the construction of additional needed storage, 
potentially causing the shutdown of the federally-licensed reactors. In 
part because of this pressure from the states, Congress has sought to 
create a federal, centralized interim storage facility while development 
of a permanent repository proceeds. This controversial effort has yet to 
succeed. This note will suggest that a new approach to the interim 
storage problem is necessary-one that involves granting the federal 
government exclusive authority over nuclear waste storage facilities. 
[WJhere a specific duty is assigned by law, and individual rights depend 
upon the performance of that duty . .. the individual who considers himself 
injured, has a right to resort to the laws of his country for a {remedyJ. 
-Marbury v. Madison 1 
INTRODUCTION 
On January 31, 1997, several electric utilities operating commer-
cial nuclear reactors petitioned the United States Court of Appeals for 
the D.C. Circuit for a writ of mandamus to require the federal gov-
ernment to begin accepting highly radioactive spent nuclear fuel 
from the utilities by a statutory deadline the following January. 2 Con-
gress set this deadline fifteen years earlier by enacting the Nuclear 
* Note Editor, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAw REVIEW, 2000-Ol. The 
author wishes to thank his brother, Alex, for his help in framing the issues in this Note. 
15 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137,166 (1803). 
2 SeeN. States Power Co. v. United States Dep't of Energy, 128 F.3d 754, 755 (D.C. Cir. 
1997) [hereinafter Narthern States Power I J. 
163 
164 Environmental Affairs [Vol. 28:163 
Waste Policy Act (NWPA) under the presumption that by January 1, 
1998 the government would have someplace to safely dispose of the 
waste.!! By 1997, there was no such safe place, and the government 
had made clear that it would not begin accepting the waste by the 
deadline-rather the waste would remain in temporary storage at the 
reactor sites where it was generated.4 
The utilities filing the petition had already gone before the D.C. 
Circuit two years earlier to seek a ruling on the extent of the govern-
ment's obligations under the NWPA5 In that case, Indiana Michigan v. 
Department of Energy, the D.C. Circuit ruled that the government had 
an unconditional obligation to accept waste by January 1, 1998.6 
Without seeking a rehearing of that ruling, or petitioning the Su-
preme Court for certiorari, the government nonetheless informed 
utilities that it would not accept waste by the deadline.7 Facing grow-
ing stores of nuclear waste and limited storage space in which to place 
it, the utilities responded by filing a suit requesting a writ of manda-
mus to force the government to honor its obligations under the 
NWPA8 
A writ of mandamus is proper only if (1) the plaintiff has a clear 
right to relief; (2) the defendant has a clear duty to act; and (3) there 
is no other adequate remedy available to the plaintiff.9 Reiterating the 
holding of Indiana Michigan,lO the D.C. Circuit Court found that the 
utilities had established a clear right to relief, and that the govern-
ment had a clear duty to act.ll The court also found, however, that 
5 See Michael A. Bauser, Recent Decisions Concerning DOE's Commercial Radioactive Waste 
DisposalProgram, 19 ENERGY LJ. 387, 387 (1998). 
4 See Final Interpretation of Nuclear Waste Acceptance Issues, 60 Fed. Reg. 21,793, 
21,793-94 (1995). Department of Energy (DOE) stated that it would not be able to begin 
taking spent nuclear fuel from utilities by Jan. 1, 1998, and that it did not have an obliga-
tion to begin accepting waste by the deadline absent a permanent waste repository or in-
terim storage facility constructed under the NWPA. See id. 
5 See Ind. Mich. Power Co. v. Dep't of Energy, 88 F.3d 1272, 1273 (D.C. Cir. 1996). 
6 Seeid. at 1277. 
7 See Northern States Power /, 128 F.3d at 756-57. 
8 See id. 
9Id. at 758. 
10 See Ind. Mich., 88 F.3d at 1277. 
11 See Northern States Power /, 128 F.3d at 758. The D.C. Circuit held in Indiana Michigan 
that the DOE had an obligation to meet the 1998 deadline, without qualification or condi~ 
tion, in return for payments made by the utilities into the Nuclear Waste Fund. The utili-
ties had dutifully paid several billion dollars into the Nuclear Waste Fund, binding DOE to 
its contractual bargain, and therefore DOE had a clear duty to act. See 88 F.3d at 1276. 
Following the ruling in Indiana Michigan, DOE nonetheless informed the utilities that it 
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there were, in fact, other adequate remedies available to the plaintiffs 
and therefore did not issue the broad writ requested by the utilities.12 
Four years after the court's ruling and over two years after the January 
31, 1998 statutory deadline has come and gone, a final remedy re-
mains unclear.13 
Ten utilities have suits pending against the Department of Energy 
(DOE) in Federal Claims Court for damages totaling $8.5 billion,14 
with total liability projected to reach as much as $40 to $80 billion.15 
Further complicating the matter, several utilities with pressing storage 
needs are limited by state regulations in the amount of waste the utili-
ties can store on-site at their reactors.16 If the federal government 
does not begin meeting its obligations under the NWPA, some reac-
tors may have to be prematurely shut down,l7 Utilities are finding 
themselves stuck at the friction point between the federal govern-
ment's delay and state governments' impatience.18 
In response to massive potential legal liability, and dwindling 
temporary storage space for spent nuclear fuel, all sides have sought a 
legislative remedy.19 The magnitude and complexity of the spent nu-
clear fuel problem, and the need for a comprehensive, coherent na-
tional policy suggests that Congress is best equipped to provide a 
remedy.2o Several bills have been introduced during the last two Con-
would be unable to accept waste by the deadline, providing the utilities with clear right to 
relief. See Northern States Power I, 128 F.3d at 757. 
12 See id. at 759. The NWPA mandated that utilities generating spent nuclear fuel enter 
into a "Standard Contract," to be discussed below, with DOE for the disposal of the spent 
fuel. See 42 U.S.C. § 10222(a) (1999). The D.C. Circuit Court found that the contract pro-
vides a potentially adequate remedy in the event one of the parties fails to meet their con-
tractual obligation--essentially administrative relief negotiated through DOE's contracting 
officer. See Northern States Power I, 128 F.3d at 756. 
13 See Bauser, supra note 3, at 394-95. 
14 See Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1999: Hearing on H.R 45 Before the Subcomm. on Energy 
and Power of the House Commerce Comm., 106th Congo (1999) [hereinafter Feb. 10, 1999 
House NWPA Hearing] (statement of Stuart Schiffer, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, 
United States Dept. of Justice) available at 1999 WL 72647. 
15 See Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1999: Hearing on S. 608 Before the Senate Comm. on Energy 
and Natural Resources, 106th Congo (1999) (statement of Chairman Frank Murkowski). 
16 See Margaret Kriz, Mountain of Trouble, 31 NAT'LJ. 2545,2543 (1999). 
17 See id. 
18 See id. 
19 See id. See also Hearing on H.R 45, the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1999 Before the Sub-
comm. on Energy and Power of the House Commerce Comm., 106th Congo (1999) [hereinafter Mar. 
12, 1999 House NWPA Hearing] (statement of Sec'y Bill Richardson, DOE) available at 
1999WL 140816. 
20 See Rep. Fred Upton, How Should Waste Be Stored? Move Waste to a Safe, Central Site, 
ROLL CALL, Mar. 6, 2000, available at 2000 WL 8733826. 
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gresses, generally focused on providing federal interim storage for 
spent nuclear fuel or having the government take title to, and 
financial responsibility for, the waste where it currently sits.21 Mter 
analyzing the legal history of the issue, however, this Comment will 
suggest that ultimately neither of these legislative fixes will proceed. 
The likely resolution will instead involve both the award of damages 
to utilities and new legislation giving the federal government exclu-
sive regulatory authority over spent nuclear fuel, thereby eliminating 
state limits on on-site storage capacity. 
I. HISTORY OF THE NUCLEAR WASTE POLICY ACT OF 1982 
A. The "One-Time-Through" Fuel Cycle 
The federal government first permitted the private use and own-
ership of nuclear facilities in 1954.22 At that time, Congress enacted 
the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 establishing a legal regime governing 
the production of nuclear energy.23 Under this system, the disposal of 
the high-level radioactive waste that results from nuclear fission24 be-
came the responsibility of the federal government.25 Federal policy 
has always been based on the premise that nuclear waste can be dis-
posed of safely.26 Despite this optimistic position, health and envi-
ronmental concerns have led to controversy and delay in the devel-
opment and siting of disposal facilities. 27 
Up until the late 1970s, one possible solution was to recycle the 
spent nuclear fue1.28 The fission reaction that occurs within a com-
mercial reactor burns up only a small percentage of the fuel's energy, 
leaving behind highly radioactive waste, within which remains 
21 See H.R. 45, 106th Cong. (1999); S. 608, 106th Congo (1999); S. 1287, 106th Congo 
(1999). 
22 See Bauser, supra note 3, at 387. 
23 See id. 
24 In a nuclear power plant, the fuel produces heat by the process of fission. See Bauser, 
supra note 3, at 387 n.l. This process creates radiation, and when the spent fuel is removed 
it remains highly radioactive. See id. 
25 See id. at 387. 
26 See Mark Holt, Civilian Nuclear Waste Disposa~ 1, 1 (last modified May 24, 2000) 
<http://www.cnie.org/nle/waste-2.html> (Congressional Research Servo Issue Brief for 
Congress No. 92059). 
27 See id. 
28 See Mark Holt, Civilian Nuclear Spent Fuel Tempurary Sturage options, 1, 3 (last modified 
Mar. 27, 1998) <http://www.cnie.org/nle/waste-20.html> (Congressional Research Servo 
Issue Brieffor Congress No. 96-212 ENR). 
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significant potential energy.29 Early on in the development of the nu-
clear power industry, the remaining energy in the waste was viewed as 
a valuable potential resource.30 In European countries, such as the 
United Kingdom, the spent nuclear fuel from commercial reactors 
has been recycled, removing the energy-depleted material from the 
spent fuel, then reprocessing what remains for use in reactors. 31 
This type of fuel cycle significantly reduces the total waste stream 
from fission reactors; however, it results in the isolation of pluto-
nium-a potential nuclear weapons proliferation risk. 32 For this rea-
son, in 1977 President Carter signed an executive order prohibiting 
the recycling of, fuel for commercial reactors.33 Although this order 
was repealed by President Reagan, the Carter precedent has pre-
vailed, and consequently, all commercial reactors in the United States 
today employ a "one-time-through" fuel cycle.34 As a result, spent nu-
clear fuel, once removed from the reactors, is stored in on-site tempo-
rary storage."35 Ironically, because all of the commercial nuclear reac-
tors operating in the United States were designed when the policy of 
the United States policy was geared towards reprocessing the spent 
fuel, on-site storage facilities are relatively small.36 
Northern States Power, the lead utility plaintiff in the suit seeking 
a writ of mandamus against DOE,37 faces a particularly dire storage 
situation.38 It designed its spent fuel facilities for short-term storage 
with the understanding that the federal government would reprocess 
29 See id. 
30 See id. 
31 See id. at 8. In the United Kingdom, British Nuclear Fuels Ltd. has recently opened a 
commercial reprocessing plant in Sellafield, England, which was developed with the inten-
tion of reprocessing spent fuel from throughout Europe, Japan, and possibly the United 
States. See id. 
32 SeeJason Hardin, Note, Tipping the Scales: Why Congress and the President Should Create 
a Federal Interim Storage Facility for High-Level Radioactive Waste, 19]. LAND RESOURCES & 
ENVTL. L. 293, 294 (1999). 
33 See id. 
34 See id. 
35 See Denise Renee Foster, Comment, Utilities: De Facto Repositories for High-Level Nuclear 
Waste? 5 DICK.]. ENVTL. L. & POL'y 375, 375 (1996). The nuclear fuel assemblies, once 
removed from the reactor core, are placed underwater to both cool the spent fuel and 
provide radiation shielding. See id. at 389 n.93. This technique of storage is safe and rela-
tively stable. Considering, however, that the spent nuclear fuel must be isolated from the 
environment for hundreds of thousands of years, on-site storage ponds clearly only offer a 
temporary solution to the waste problem. See id. 
iI6 Holt, supra note 28, at 3. 
37 See Norther States Power l, 128 F.3d 754, 754 (D.C. Cir. 1997). 
38 See Kriz, supra note 16, at 2543. 
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the fuel or provide for permanent disposal.!l9 The utility did not an-
ticipate the need to provide long-term storage of its spent fuel, so it 
does not have large amounts of storage space, and thus it is quickly 
running out of room.40 Complicating matters further, the State of 
Minnesota, where Northern States Power is located, passed a law in 
1986 requiring any entity seeking to construct a radioactive waste 
management facility in the state to get express authorization to do so 
from the Minnesota legislature.41 
This law had been passed with the intent of preventing DOE 
from locating a permanent nuclear waste repository in Minnesota.42 
One early proposal for disposing of the nation's n¥clear waste had 
been to bury it under a granite formation underlying the state.43 That 
plan was scrapped, but the Minnesota law resurfaced in a related con-
text when, in 1993, Northern States Power sought approval from the 
Minnesota Public Utilities Commission to expand on-site storage at its 
Prairie Island Plant.44 The Commission approved the plan, but it was 
successfully challenged in the Minnesota Court of Appeals, and 
Northern States Power had to seek legislative approval for its expan-
sion plan.45 
Approval was granted by the legislature in 1994, but only for 
enough additional storage space to last through 2002, and at a sub-
stantial cost to the utility.46 When, in 1998, Northern States Power 
again sought approval to store more spent fuel on-site, the company 
was granted permission to do so by the Minnesota Public Utilities 
Commission.47 That decision was appealed, however, and in the result-
ing suit the appeals court squarely placed the blame for the resulting 
legal mess on the federal government. 48 "The history of this case can 
be traced to the failure of Congress and the federal government to 
39 See Holt, supra note 28. 
40 See Kriz, supra note 16, at 2543. 
41 See In re Application for a Certificate of Need for Const. of an Indep. Spent Fuel 
Storage Installation, 501 N .W.2d 638, 642 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993). 
42 See Holt, supra note 28. 
43 See Dean Rebuffoni, Minnesota May Be Considered as Nuclear-Waste Ri!pository, MINNEA-
POLIS STAR-'TIuBUNE,Jan. 9,1986,1986 WI.. 4804lO4. 
44 See In re Applicationfora Certificate of Need, 501 N.W.2d at 640-43,649. 
45 See id. 
46 See Kriz, supra note 16, at 2543. The Minnesota Legislature, as a condition to approv-
ing Northern States Power's plan, required the utility to make payments into a renewable 
energy fund. See id. By Jan. 2000, the utility had paid $3.5 million into the fund. See id. 
47 See In re Application of Northern States Power Co. for Approval of Its 1998 Resource 
Plan, 604 N.W.2d 386, 388 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000). 
46 See id. at 387. 
2000] Nuclear Waste Policy 169 
fulfill a compact to construct and, in 1998, to begin receiving high-
level nuclear waste generated by the country's nuclear power 
plants. "49 The decision of the Commission was upheld in that case, 
allowing Northern States Power to store additional waste in the com-
pany's existing storage pools, but that provided only a temporary res-
pite for the utility. 50 
B. Nuclear Waste Policy Act oj 1982 
In response to the accumulation of spent nuclear fuel at com-
mercial reactors, Congress passed the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 
1982.51 When Congress did this, it acknowledged that the federal gov-
ernment's efforts to devise a permanent solution to the problem of 
civilian radioactive waste disposal had not been adequate.52 Further, 
the government had the responsibility to provide a permanent dis-
posal solution.53 Prior to the creation of a permanent disposal site, the 
NWPA assigned responsibility for interim storage to the utilities gen-
erating spent nuclear fuel,54 Interim storage prior to the creation of a 
permanent disposal site was made the responsibility of the utilities 
generating spent nuclear fuel,55 Furthermore, utilities were obligated 
to pay into the Nuclear Waste Fund to cover the costs of disposa1.56 In 
return, the federal government, through DOE, was obligated to take 
and dispose of the spent nuclear fuel in a permanent geologic reposi-
tory beginning on January 31, 1998.57 
The NWPA required utilities to enter into a Standard Contract 
containing the following provisions:58 
following the commencement of operation of a repository, 
the Secretary shall take title to the high-level radioactive 
waste or spent nuclear fuel involved as expeditiously as prac-
49Id. 
50 See id. at 391. Northern States Power will completely run out of space for the storage 
of spent fuel by 2007 unless it is able to build new, additional storage facilities. See Kriz, 
supra note 16, at 2543. 
51 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 10101-10270 (1999). 
52 See 42 U.S.C. § 10131 (a) (3)-(4). 
53 See id. 
54 Ind. Mich. Power Co. v. Dep't of Energy, 88 F.3d 1272, 1273 (D.C. Cir. 1996). 
55 See Bauser, supra note 3, at 387. 
56 See id. at 388. 
57 See id. 
58 Ind. Mich. Power; 88 F.3d at 1273. 
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ticable upon the request of the generator owner of such 
waste or spent fuel; and 
in return for payment of fees established by this section, the 
Secretary, beginning not later than January 31, 1998, will dis-
pose of the high-level radioactive waste or spent nuclear fuel 
involved as provided in this subchapter.59 
Beginning in 1983, utilities entered into these standard contracts with 
DOE as directed by the NWPA.6o The utilities were obligated to pay 
into the Nuclear Waste Fund a fixed annual fee of a tenth of a cent 
(one mil) per kilowatt-hour of electricity that their nuclear reactors 
generated.61 Congress then made annual appropriations from the 
fund to DOE for development of a repository.62 By September of 
1999, the fund had collected over $15 billion from utilities.63 
C. Yucca Mountain Repository 
In 1987, Congress limited the sites under consideration by DOE 
for a geologic repository to Yucca Mountain in Nevada.64 In general, 
the safe geologic disposal of nuclear waste appears technically feasible 
because, although the waste must remain isolated from the environ-
ment for many thousands of years, many geologic formations are be-
lieved to remain undisturbed for millions of years.65 According to the 
National Research Council, "[t]here is no scientific or technical rea-
son to think that a satisfactory geological repository cannot be 
built."66 The Yucca Mountain project has remained extremely contro-
versial, however, in large part because it is extraordinarily difficult to 
predict the integrity of the repository over a period of 10,000 years, as 
is required by the NWPA.67 The State of Nevada has vigorously op-
59 42 U.S.C. § 10222 (a) (5) (A)-(B) (emphasis added). 
60 See id. 
61 See 42 U.S.C. § 10222 (a) (2). 
62 See Holt, supra note 26, at 7. 
63 See Kriz, supra note 16, at 2543. 
64 See Holt, supra note 26, at 3. 
65 See id. 
66 Id. 
67 See id. In an interview with a senior Senate staff member who has worked extensively 
on the issue, it was suggested to the author that the NWPA was something of a white ele-
phant for the civilian nuclear power industry. Unlike aU other forms of electricity genera-
tion, nuclear power has a "closed" fuel cycle-the waste generated cannot be dispersed 
into the common via a smokestack or other method. The waste must be disposed of or 
recycled in some manner, and thus, if the fuel cycle cannot be closed, the industry cannot 
continue to operate. While ostensibly the NWPA provides for disposal and limits the indus-
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posed the site because of concerns about earthquakes in the area and 
groundwater contamination.68 
Significant delays from the original schedule imposed by the 
NWPA have resulted from the scientific uncertainty involved in testing 
of the site, as well as poor program management and, DOE contends, 
funding shortfalls in Congress' appropriations.69 Following years of 
exploratory studies at the site, the initial "viability assessment" for 
YUcca Mountain was issued by DOE on December 18, 1998, over ten 
. months after the depository was supposed to begin accepting waste.70 
Although the Draft Environmental Impact Statement, completed in 
July 1999, recommended proceeding with the project, the planned 
repository is not scheduled to open until 20lO at the earliest.7I DOE 
Secretary Bill Richardson has stated that although no technical 
"showstoppers" have been discovered, uncertainties remain.72 A final 
Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) is due to be completed this 
year (2000) .731£ this evaluation finds the site to be suitable, DOE must 
then get presidential approval to apply to the Nuclear Regulatory 
Agency for a construction permit and operating license.74 Many hur-
dles remain to be cleared before the site is ready to accept spent fuel, 
and although DOE believes that it is on track to begin operating the 
repository in 2010, the variables involved are significant. 75 
When it became clear to DOE in 1995 that the Yucca Mountain 
project would not be ready by the January 31, 1998, deadline, DOE 
issued a notice to utilities that it would not begin to accept spent nu-
clear fuel by that date.76 The Agency concluded that it did not have an 
unconditional statutory or contractual obligation to accept spent fuel 
in the absence of a repository or interim storage facility.77 As a result 
try's liability for the radioactive waste it generates, it was suggested that because the NWPA 
requires site performance standards to be accurately predicted for 10,000 years and be-
yond-an inherently uncertain endeavor-site evaluation would take so long that the civil-
ian nuclear power industry would in the meantime be forced out of business. 
68 See Holt, supra note 26, at 3-4. 
69 See id. at 3-4. Although the Nuclear Waste Fund is amply funded, DOE cannot 
spend the waste fees without Congressional approval, and only about half the fees col-
lected have been appropriated. [d. 
70 See id. at 3. 
71 See id. 
72 See Mar. 12, 1999 House NWPAHearing, supra note 19. 
7~ See Holt, supra note 26, at 10. 
74 See id. 
75 Seeid. 
76 See Ind. Mich. Power Co. v. Dep't of Energy, 88 F.3d 1272, 1274 (D.C. Cir 1996). 
77 See id. 
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of these findings by DOE, several utilities brought suit against the 
Agency. 78 
II. THE LITIGATION OF THE NWPA 
A. Indiana Michigan Power Co. v. DOE 
The first suit brought against DOE regarding the Agency's obli-
gations under the NWPA was Indiana Michigan Power Co. v. DOE.79 In 
that case, several utilities and state commissions that paid fees into the 
Nuclear Waste Fund sought review of DOE's 1995 order declaring 
that the Agency was not obligated to dispose of high-level waste in the 
absence of an operational repository.8o 
DOE based its view of its statutory and contractual obligations, or 
lack thereof, upon an Agency construction of the NWPA.81 In review-
ing an Agency's construction of a statute entrusted to its administra-
tion, the court followed the two-step statutory analysis established in 
Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council.82 The Chevron analy-
sis involves asking first whether Congress has spoken unambiguously 
to the question at hand.83 If Congress has spoken unambiguously, the 
court must "follow that language and give it effect. "84 If not, the court 
will defer to the Agency's interpretation if it is reasonable and consis-
tent with the statute's purpose.85 
DOE contended that if the NWPA was examined as a whole, the 
only interpretation possible was that its acceptance of nuclear waste 
was not determined solely by the passage of the January 31, 1998 
deadline, but was further conditioned upon the availability of a re-
pository.86 Section 302(a) (5) (B) of the NWPA states that "in return 
for the payment of fees ... [DOE], beginning not later than January 
31, 1998, will dispose of [spent nuclear fuel] .... "87 DOE contended 
that in order to "dispose," a repository must first exist, and therefore, 
78 See id. 
79 See id. 
80 See id. at 1273. 
81 See Ind. Mich. Power, 88 F.3d at 1274. 
82 See id.; see also Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Ine., 467 U.S. 837, 
842-43 (1984). 
83 See Ind. Mich. Power, 88 F.3d at 1274. 
81 See id. (quoting Wis. Elee. Power v. DOE, 778 F.2d I, 4 (D.C. Cir. 1985)). 
85 See id. 
86 See id. 
87 Nuclear Waste Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 10222(a) (5) (B). 
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the Agency's obligation under the statute was conditioned upon such 
a repository being completed.88 
The D.C. Circuit Court found that Congress had spoken unam-
biguously to the question at hand, and that DOE's interpretation of 
the NWPA was contrary to Congress' clear intent.89 Therefore, the 
Agency's construction of the statute did not survive the first step of 
the Chevron analysis.90 The court found that the statute made DOE's 
obligation to accept and take title to the waste existed independent of 
the availability of a permanent repository.91 Furthermore, the lan-
guage of the Standard Contract that the utilities were obligated by the 
NWPA to enter into with DOE strengthened the court's interpreta-
tion.92 In the contract, the only limitation placed upon DOE's obliga-
tion to accept waste by January 31, 1998 was that the obligation was 
made in return for the utilities' payment of fees into the Nuclear 
Waste Fund.93 Noting that DOE's interpretation implied that the 
payment of fees by the utilities was for nothing, the court compared 
the Agency's argument to the Yiddish saying "Here is air; give me 
money. "94 
In sum, the court found that "[t]he Department's treatment of 
this statute is not an interpretation but a rewrite. It not only blue-
pencils out the phrase 'not later than January 31, 1998,' but destroys 
the quid pro quo created by Congress. ''95 The absence of a repository 
did not relieve DOE of its statutory obligation under the NWPA; it 
merely limited the remedies available to the court.96 Because the 
deadline had not passed at the time of the decision, the court re-
manded the case to the Agency and held that DOE had an uncondi-
tional obligation to accept waste by the deadline.97 
88 See Ind. Mich. Power, 88 F.3d at 1275. 
89 See id. 
90 See id. 
91 See id. 
92 See id. at 1276. 
9~ See Ind. Mich. Power, 88 F.3d at 1276. 
94 Id. 
95Id. 
96 See id. at 1277. 
97 See id. 
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B. Northern States Power Company, et at., v. United States Department of 
Energy 
Notwithstanding the court's holding, DOE did not change its 
course of action and announced it would be unable to begin accept-
ing spent nuclear fuel by January 31, 1998.98 One year prior to the 
deadline, on January 31, 1997, several utilities filed suit seeking a writ 
of mandamus to compel DOE compliance with the Indiana Michigan 
Power decision.99 While the case, Northern States Power v. United States 
DOE, was pending, DOE acknowledged on June 27, 1997 that it had 
an obligation to accept waste by the deadline. loo DOE further stated, 
however, that the Standard Contract provided for remedies in case of 
non-compliance, and that DOE was not obligated to provide a 
financial remedy for the delay because the delay was "unavoidable. "101 
In essence, DOE acknowledged it had an obligation, but that the ob-
ligation created no liability.l02 
The court in Northern States Power v. United States DOE did not is-
sue a broad writ of mandamus forcing DOE to accept waste by the 
deadline.103 This was because although the petitioners had a clear 
right to relief and DOE had a clear duty to act, other remedies were 
available under the Standard Contract. I04 The court did find, how-
ever, that a more limited writ was required.105 DOE was in effect ignor-
ing the ruling in Indiana Michigan Power.06 by claiming that the 
Agency's delay carried with it no liability.l07 Therefore, the court is-
sued a writ of mandamus precluding DOE from finding that its delay 
was unavoidable-and thus non-recompensable-on the ground that 
it had not yet prepared a permanent repository.108 Otherwise, under 
DOE's interpretation of the contract, the government could always 
absolve itself from bearing the costs of delay even if the delay was 
98 See Bauser, supra note 3, at 391. 
99 See Narthern States Power l, 128 F.3d 754, 759 (D.C. Cir. 1997). 
100 See Bauser, supra note 3, at 391. 
101 See id. at 392. 
102 See id. 
103 See Narthern States Power l, 128 F.3d at 759. A writ of mandamus is proper only if (1) 
the plaintiff has a clear right to relief; (2) the defendant has a clear duty to act; and (3) 
there is no other adequate remedy available to plaintiff. See id. at 758. 
1M See id. at 758-59. 
105 See id. at 759. 
106 88 F.3d 1272, 1277 (D.C. Cir. 1996). 
107 See Narthern States Power l, 128 F.3d at 759. 
108 [d. 
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caused by the government's own acts.109 The effect in sum of this rul-
ing was to deny the utilities' request for specific performance of their 
contracts with DOE, but it also barred DOE's defense for breach of 
contract claims.110 
C. Federal Claims Court Suits 
Subsequent to the decision in Northern States Power v. United States 
DOE, and following the passage of the January 31,1998 deadline, sev-
eral utilities brought two separate suits in Federal Claims Court 
against DOE seeking monetary damages for breach of contract.lll In 
the ruling on the first suit, DOE was ordered, on a motion for sum-
mary judgment, to pay damages. ll2 While the court acknowledged 
that a provision of the contract between the utilities and DOE man-
dated that the parties seek administrative relief in the event of delays, 
the court held that the provision did not automatically bar a court 
action for additional relief.1l3 The final damages associated with DOE 
liability were left to be determined in further proceedings.1l4 
In a separate suit brought by the plaintiff in the original Northern 
States Power v. United States DOE suit, the Federal Claims Court reached 
the opposite conclusion.l15 The court found that the plaintiff's claim 
"arose under" the contract and although DOE's anticipated delay of 
twelve or more years in performing was significant, it did not amount 
to an actionable breach.1l6 Therefore, the suit was dismissed and the 
plaintiff was directed to pursue its claim through the administrative 
remedies established in the Standard Contract. ll7 The contract pro-
vides that in the event of an unavoidable delay, neither party can be 
held liable for damages. llS If the delay is deemed avoidable, the con-
tract will be equitably adjusted to reflect any additional cost incurred 
by the party not responsible for or contributing to the delay.119 A dis-
109 See id. 
110 See id. at 761. 
111 See N. States Power Co. v. United States, 43 Fed. Cl. 374 (Fed. Cl. 1999) [hereinafter 
Northern States Power Ill. Conn. Yankee Atomic Power Co. v. United States, 42 Fed. Cl. 448 
(Fed. Cl. 1998); Yankee Atomic Elec. Co. v. United States, 42 Fed. Cl. 223 (Fed. Cl. 1998). 
112 See Holt, supra note 26, at 4. 
m See Yankee Atomic, 42 Fed. Cl. at 236. 
J14 See id. at 237. 
J15 See Northern States II, 43 Fed. Cl. at 388. 
116 See id. 
117 See id. 
118 See id. at 377. 
119 See id. 
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pute arising under the contract as to whether a delay is avoidable or 
unavoidable shall be decided by DOE's Contracting Officer,120 
Both of these rulings were appealed to the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Federal Circuit, and were treated as companion 
cases. l2l Deciding both suits simultaneously on August 31, 2000, the 
court ruled against DOE, allowing both sets of plaintiffs to seek dam-
ages beyond those provided in the Standard Contract.122 The court 
found that DOE had failed to perform a critical and central contrac-
tual duty by missing the January 31, 1998 deadline.123 DOE's delay 
represented a fundamental breach of the Standard Contract, and the 
utilities were not constrained to follow the disputes provisions con-
tained therein.124 
Finally, in August 1999, Wisconsin Electric filed suit with the 
United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit seeking monetary 
and non-monetary relief.125 While the claim was similar to those 
brought by other utilities in Federal Claims Court, unlike those utili-
ties, Wisconsin Electric has previously sought to resolve its dispute 
with DOE through the Department's Contracting Officer,126 This suit 
alleged that although Wisconsin Electric had aggressively pursued 
administrative remedies under the Standard Contract for over a year, 
DOE had refused to grant the relief to which the company is enti-
tled,127 The D.C. Circuit Court dismissed the case for want of jurisdic-
tion, however, stating that contract disputes with DOE must be settled 
by the Court of Federal Claims.128 
III. ATTEMPTED RESOLUTIONS 
Taken together, the litigation brought to date against DOE sug-
gests that ultimately the Agency could be held liable for staggering 
sums of money, either as a result of direct breach-of-contract claims, 
or for claims brought following a breakdown of administrative reme-
120 See id. at 377-78. 
121 See Me. Yankee Atomic Elec. Co. v. United States, 1999 WL 626530 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 
122 See Me. Yankee Atomic Elec. Co. v. United States, 2000 WL 1230587, at *8 (Fed. Cir. 
2000); N. States Power Co. v. United States, 2000 WL 1231054, at *8 (Fed. Cir. 2000). 
123 See Me. Yankee, 2000 WL 1230587, at *6. 
124 See id. at *7 
125 See Wisconsin Electric Sues DOE After Nuclear Talks Falter, INSIDE ENERGY, Aug. 30, 
1999, available in 1999WL 12810518. 
126 See id. 
127 See id. 
128 See Wis. Elec. Power Co. v. United States Dep't of Energy, 211 F.3d 646, 648 (D.C. 
Cir.2000). 
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dies. l29 Although the utilities would rather receive specific perform-
ance of the contracts requiring DOE to take possession of their stock-
piled spent fuel, such an outcome is unlikely}SO The United States 
Supreme Court, on March 6, 2000, declined to hear an appeal by the 
utilities seeking to overturn the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals deci-
sion to not require the government to begin accepting spent nuclear 
fuel}SI Thus, any resolution provided by the judiciary, aside from a 
negotiated settlement,I32 will be limited to financial compensation.I33 
In part because such a resolution would both place a huge bur-
den on the federal budget and fail to ultimately hasten the safe dis-
posal of the spent fuel, Congress has repeatedly attempted to craft a 
legislative remedy.I34 In the 106th Congress, legislation has been in-
troduced in both the Senate and the House of Representatives to cre-
ate an interim storage facility at Yucca Mountain and to begin storing 
spent nuclear fuel there pending the likely completion of a perma-
nent repository at that location.I35 Such a facility could expedite 
DOE's ability to meet its obligation to utilities under the NWPA.I36 
Although an interim storage facility would be essentially the same de-
sign as current temporary on-site facilities, proponents argue that 
storing the spent fuel in one centralized location is safer than having 
the material dispersed throughout the United States.137 Perhaps most 
importantly, interim storage would alleviate the pressure on utilities 
that are facing the possibility of running out of storage capacity at 
their reactor sites. ISS 
Interim storage legislation-sought by the nuclear utility indus-
try-has been strongly opposed, however, by environmental organiza-
tions, the Nevada congressional delegation, and the Clinton Admini-
129 See id. Although DOE Secretary Richardson has suggested that the department is 
willing to take title to spent fuel kept on-site at power plants, DOE has yet to successfully 
negotiate any non-monetary remedies with holders of spent nuclear fuel. See id. 
130 See Northern States Power 1, 128 F.3d 754, 759 (D.C. Cir. 1997). 
m See Lorie Asseo, Court Declines Fuel Disposal Fight, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Mar. 6, 2000, 
available in 2000 WL 15786653. 
132 Secretary Richardson asserts that DOE does not currently have the authority to ne-
gotiate a settlement, and that Congress must first pass legislation allowing the Department 
to settle with the utilities. See Proposal Would Have DOE Take Title to Waste if Utilities Drop Law-
suits, ELECTRIC UTILITY WEEK, May 3,1999, available in 1999 WL 12165446. 
13~ SeeAsseo, supra note 131. 
134 SeeH.R. 45, 106th Congo (1999); S. 608, 106th Congo (1999); S. 1287, 106th Congo 
1999). 
135 SeeH.R. 45, 106th Congo (1999); S. 608, 106th Congo (1999). 
136 See Holt, supra note 28, at 6. 
137 See Upton, supra note 20. 
138 See id. 
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strati on, and has very little chance of final passage in Congress.139 
Opponents to the legislation argue that spent fuel should not be 
moved to \Ucca Mountain prior to a final determination of the site's 
suitability as a permanent repository,140 Concerns remain regarding 
the potential for earthquakes and groundwater contamination at the 
site.l41 Also, creating a temporary facility at \Ucca Mountain prior to a 
final determination on its suitability would create the perception that 
a determination had been made before all the technical evaluations 
of the site are complete.l42 Furthermore, if \Ucca Mountain is ulti-
mately found to be unsuitable as a repository, any spent fuel stored 
there temporarily would have to be transported twice: once to \Ucca 
Mountain, and again to wherever a permanent repository is ultimately 
located.l43 Or in the event that an alternative location could not be 
found, a temporary facility at \Ucca Mountain could become a de facto 
permanent storage facility.l44 
An alternative to interim storage would be for DOE to take title 
to the spent fuel and keep it on site at the power plants pending 
completion of a final repository.l45 Energy Secretary Richardson has 
suggested the Administration is interested in pursuing this option.l46 
Although the spent fuel would remain at the reactor sites, the "take 
title" option would relieve utilities of both the liability and costs asso-
ciated with continued on-site storage.l47 In a compromise with the 
Administration, the Chairman of the Senate Energy Committee, 
Senator Frank Murkowski-a strong proponent of interim storage-
introduced "take title" legislation in the 106th Congress.l48 
As introduced, this legislation would have given utilities the op-
tion of dropping claims against DOE in exchange for having the 
Agency take title to their spent fuel as well as undertake the financial 
costs associated with continued on-site storage.l49 The legislation also 
139 See Mar. 12, 1999 House NWPA Hearing, supra note 19, (statement of Sec'y Bill 
Richardson, DOE); see also Holt, supra note 28, at 7. 
140 See Holt, supra note 28, at 7. 
141 See id. 
142 See id. 
143 See Rep. Jim Gibbons, H.R. 45 Is Bad for Nevada, Environment and Nation, ROLL CALL, 
Mar. 6, 2000, available at 2000 WI... 8733826. 
144 See id. 
145 See Mar. 12, 1999 House NWPA Hearing, supra note 19 (statement of Sec'y Bill 
Richardson, DOE). 
146 See id. 
147 Seeid. 
148 SeeS. 1287, 106th Congo (1999). 
149 See id. 
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included provisions allowing for interim storage at Yucca Mountain 
beginning in 2007, and restricted the Environmental Protection 
Agency's ability to set radiation release standards for the site.150 
Chairman Murkowski had included the "take title" language in 
the bill with the hopes of passing nuclear waste legislation that would 
not face a presidential veto.151 Ironically, Chairman Murkowski re-
moved the "take title" provision from the bill just prior to its passage 
by the Senate out of a concern that the bill would not be approved by 
a veto-proof majority of sixty-seven votes.152 Seven northeastern gov-
ernors had come out against the provision and had asked the Sena-
tors representing their states to vote against the bill, effectively doom-
ing the legislation.I53 
The governors' objections to the bill arose out of concerns that if 
the federal government took title to the spent fuel, there would no 
longer be pressure on DOE to move the waste to a permanent reposi-
tory.154 As a result, the governors felt the on-site waste storage facilities 
in their states could become de facto permanent depositories.155 The 
governors' reasoning was very similar to that employed by opponents 
of interim storage at Yucca Mountain.156 
Both of the proposed temporary solutions to the spent fuel prob-
lem-"take title" legislation and interim storage-have run into 
strong opposition precisely because they may, in fact, not be so tem-
porary.157 Chairman Murkowski's much fought-over measure ulti-
mately only received sixty-four votes for final passage-four votes shy 
of the m.yority needed to overcome a threatened presidential veto.I58 
As a result, a frustrated Senator Murkowski declared the bill "dead. "159 
Indeed, on April 25, 2000, President Clinton vetoed the bill, and 
150 See id. 
151 See Tina Davis, Revised NukR Waste Bill Does Not Win Democratic Favor, THE ENERGY 
DAILY, Feb. 10, 2000. 
152 See Brody Mullins, Governors Get Murkowski to Drop Nuclear Waste Provision, NATIONAL 
JOURNAL'S CONGRESS DAILY, Feb. 9, 2000, available at 2000 WL 11085618. 
153 See id. 
154 See id. 
155 See id. 
156 See id. 
157 See Mullins, supra note 147. 
158 See Senate Effort to Speed Up Nuclear Waste Shipments Declared Dead Until Next Year, Co-
PLEY NEWS SERVICE, Feb. 10, 2000. 
159 See id. 
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upon reconsideration by the Senate, it failed to receive the two-thirds 
majority of votes necessary to override the veto.160 
IV. A LIKELY RESOLUTION 
A. Legislative Solutions Considered by Congress 
It is becoming increasingly apparent that the 106th Congress, like 
past Congresses, will not be able to achieve the necessary political 
consensus to pass into law either an interim storage or a "take title" 
measure. Although Energy Secretary Richardson has expressed his 
belief that DOE will be able to take title of the spent fuel while it re-
mains on-site at nuclear power plants around the country,161 he has 
also made clear that DOE can not take such a step without authority 
from Congress,162 As a result, DOE will likely remain delinquent on its 
obligations under the NWPA, and the utilities that signed contracts 
pursuant to the NWPA will continue to press their claims against the 
government in court.163 
B. Judicial Solutions 
Should the remedy provided by the judiciary be limited to dam-
ages-as is almost certain I64-the financial liability of the federal gov-
ernment has been projected to be as large as $80 billion,165 The fed-
eral government has already been found liable for breach of contracts 
made pursuant to the NWPA in Maine Yankee Atomic Power Co. v. United 
160 See generally Me. Yankee Atomic Power v. United States, 2000 WL 1230587 (Fed.Cir. 
2000), N. States Power Co. v. United States, 2000 WL 1231054 (Fed. Cir. 2000). 
161 See Dan Harrie, Nuclear Waste, Tailings Occupy Western Governors, SALT LAKE TRIBUNE, 
June 16, 1999, available at 1999 WL 3366166 (quoting Sec'y Richardson as saying at a West-
ern Governors Conference, "DOE will take title to waste at the facilities while we look at 
the viability of Yucca Mountain."). 
162 See Proposal Would Have DOE Take Title to Waste if Utilities Drop Lawsuits, ELECTRIC 
UTILITY WEEK, May 3,1999, available at 1999 WL 12165446. 
163 See generally Me. Yankee, 2000 WL 1230587, *1. 
164 See Court Declines Fuel Disposal Fight, THE ASSOCIATED PRESS, Mar. 6, 2000, available at 
2000 WL 15786653 (discussing the Supreme Court's refusal to review a lower court order 
limiting a damages remedy against a utility); see also Northern States Power 1, 128 F.3d 754, 
761 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (holding DOE had an unconditional obligation to accept waste, but 
refusing to order specific performance). 
165 See Energy Secretary Hopes for Waste Pact this Session, LAs VEGAS REVIEW-JOURNAL, Mar. 
9, 2000, at 4A. 
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Statesl66 and Northern States Power Company v. United States,167 although 
the amount of damages in those cases have yet to be established,168 
The damages estimates are so extraordinarily large because of 
three costly factors. First, utilities have already paid over $15 billion 
into the government's Nuclear Waste Fund in return for the govern-
ment's obligation to provide a permanent repositorY,169 Absent such a 
repository, utilities will seek to stop being required to make additional 
contributions to the Nuclear Waste Fund and to recover contributions 
already made po The Nuclear Energy Institute has contended that 
DOE's failure to begin accepting spent fuel could require the gov-
ernment to refund all fees paid into the fund plus two to three times 
that amount in interest,17I In order to put pressure on DOE, some 
state regulators have begun to consider forbidding nuclear utilities 
from passing the fees they pay pursuant to the NWPA through to their 
customers.I72 Such machinations increase the likelihood that utilities 
will be aggressive in recovering their costs from DOE. 
Second, as long as a permanent repository does not exist, utilities 
will have to pay additional costs to continue storing spent fuel on-site, 
as well as to construct costly new storage facilities as more spent fuel is 
generated.173 A 1993 study by the Electric Power Research Institute 
estimated that each reactor in the United States that had filled its cur-
rent storage facilities would need to spend between $700,000 and $1.3 
million per year to build additional storage capacityP4 Total industry-
wide costs are projected to range between $350 million and $650 mil-
lion through 2010, and will go higher if a repository is not available by 
that date,175 
Finally, some utilities may be unable to build additional storage 
space and could thereby be forced to shut down and decommission 
nuclear power plants, resulting in significant consequential monetary 
damagesP6 State governments, concerned about having de facto per-
manent nuclear waste facilities within their boundaries because of 
166 See 2000 WL 1230587, *8. 
167 See2000WL 1231054, *3. 
168 1999 WL 626530. 
169 See Kriz, supra note 16, at 2543. 
170 See Holt, supra note 28, at 6. 
171 See id. 
172 See id. at 3 
173 See id. at 5. 
174Id. 
175 See Holt, supra note 28, at 5. 
176 See id. at 7. 
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DOE's delay in opening a permanent repository, may pass laws block-
ing the construction of additional on-site storage facilities.177 As dis-
cussed above, Northern States Power has already faced a possible 
shutdown of its nuclear generating plant because the utility had to 
seek state legislative approval in Minnesota to build additional storage 
space.178 As state and local opposition increases, concerns about the 
cost of additional storage will be overtaken by concerns about the 
ability to build such storage at all, and thereby continue to operate 
the nation's nuclear plants. 
The United States Court of Federal Claims, unlike the politically 
deadlocked Congress, is capable of resolving the first two of these is-
sues: the recovery of funds from the Nuclear Waste Fund and the cost 
of continued on-site storage.179 While the damages have the potential 
to be huge, the court has the ability to resolve the cost issues arising 
out of DOE's failure to meet its obligations under the Nuclear Waste 
Policy Act. ISO What is not so clear is what will result from state opposi-
tion to on-site storage in the form of laws restricting construction of 
additional facilities and how this will affect the ability of utilities to 
continue to operate their nuclear reactors, regardless of the cost of 
such storage. 
C. Utilities' Solutions 
In part because of this looming problem, utilities have pressed 
Congress to require DOE to provide interim storage for, or take title 
to, the spent fuel on-site.I81 As discussed above, however, these options 
are currently not politically achievable. IS2 
Utilities facing state opposition to expanded on-site storage have 
also begun to pursue the development of private, off-site storage fa-
cilities.183 A consortium of utilities has applied to the Nuclear Regula-
tory Commission for a license to build a private storage facility on the 
Goshute Indian reservation in Utah.184 The Goshute facility faces a 
lengthy regulatory approval process, and strong political opposi-
177 See id. 
178 See id. 
179 See Yankee Atomic Elec. Co. v. United States, 42 Fed. Cl. 223, 235 (Fed. Cl. 1998). 
180 See id. 
181 Kriz, supra note 16, at 2543. 
182 See Holt, supra note 26. 
183 See Harrie, supra note 153 (discussing a nuclear waste storage facility on the 
Goshute Indian Reservation in Utah proposed by a consortium of electric power utilities). 
184 See Holt, supra note 28. 
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tion.185 As a result, continuing to keep spent fuel on-site at the reac-
tors where it is generated is likely to be the only storage option for 
utilities at least through 2010.186 
Consequently, utilities such as Northern States Power, who have 
been unsuccessful in getting DOE to begin accepting waste, face an 
increasingly uncertain future because of the potential legislative veto 
that state lawmakers can wield over expanding needed on-site stor-
age.187 In effect, utilities in states like Minnesota with radioactive waste 
laws find themselves at the friction point between an extremely com-
plex federal regulatory scheme fraught with delays and increasingly 
impatient state legislatures. ls8 On March 3, 2000, a potential solution 
to this problem was provided in a lawsuit filed in United States District 
Court in Nevada by the Department of Justice.189 In a situation with 
factors similar to the scenario in which some nuclear utilities are 
finding themselves, DOE has asked the Department of Justice to rein 
in a state Agency holding up the development of a nuclear waste re-
pository.190 
D. Federal Preemption of State Laws 
The DOE, in the course of construction at the YUcca Mountain 
facility in Nevada, applied to the state for water permits.19l The Ne-
vada legislature, opposing the siting of a nuclear waste repository at 
Yucca Mountain, passed a law that prohibits the storage of radioactive 
waste in the state.192 Based upon that law, the Nevada State Engineer 
denied DOE the required water permits.193 The Justice Department is 
appealing the engineer's decision in United States District Court on 
the grounds that the Nevada state law is preempted by the federal 
Nuclear Waste Policy Act.194 
185 See id.; Harrie, supra note 153, at D2; see also Kriz, supra note 16, at 2543. 
186 See id. 
187 See Holt, supra note 28. 
188 See id. 
189 See DOE Challenging Nevada Law Barring Nuckar Waste Disposal, THE ENERGY DAILY, 
Mar. 13, 2000. 
190 See id. 
191 See id. 
192 See id. As is discussed infra, this law has already been litigated in Nevada v. Watkins, 
914 F.2d 1545 (9th Cir. 1990). In that case, the court ultimately reached its decision based 
upon the Property Clause of the Constitution, not the Supremacy Clause, whereas in the 
current case it appears the government is basing its appeal on the NWPA's preemption of 
the Nevada law. See DOE Challenging Nevada Law, THE ENERGY DAILY, Mar. 13,2000. 
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The doctrine of preemption comes from the Supremacy Clause, 
found in Article VI, clause 2 of the Constitution, which elevates fed-
eral law above that of the states.195 Any inquiry into federal preemp-
tion must initially determine whether Congress has acted pursuant to 
the powers delegated to it by the Constitution, as opposed to those 
powers reserved to the states by the Tenth Amendment.196 Once Con-
gress' authority to regulate in a given area is established, the question 
is whether Congress exercised its power in such a manner as to ex-
clude states from exercising concurrent jurisdiction over the same 
subject matter.197 This inquiry involves asking first whether compli-
ance with both federal and state law is a physical impossibility.l98 If so, 
the state law is excluded. l99 Second, if such compliance is not impos-
sible, but Congress has unequivocally and expressly declared that its 
authority shall be exclusive, then states can not simultaneously exert 
authority over the subjeCt matter.2OO Third, where Congress has not 
expressly prohibited dual regulation or declared its exclusionary ex-
ercise of authority over the subject matter, federal preemption may be 
implied in two general ways.201 Where the federal regulatory scheme 
is so pervasive as to occupy a given field, then any state law falling 
within the field is preempted.202 Also, where the state law stands as an 
obstacle to the accomplishment of the full purposes and objectives of 
Congress, then the federal regulation is exclusive.203 
It has long been established that Congress has the constitution-
ally-delegated authority to regulate over the entire spectrum of nu-
clear energy.204 Early on in the commercialization of nuclear energy, 
Congress found that federal regulation was necessary and appropriate 
under the constitutionally-granted powers over the common defense 
and security, interstate commerce, and promotion of the general wel-
fare. 205 Upon relinquishing monopolistic government control over 
nuclear energy to commercial utilities, Congress established federal 
195 N. States Power Co. v. Minn., 447 F.2d 1143, 1145 (8th Cir. 1971). 
196 [d. at 1146. 
197 Id. 
198 [d. 
199 See id. 
200 N. States Power Co. v. Minn., 447 F.2d at 1146. 
201 See Nev. v. Watkins, 914 F.2d 1545, 1560 (9th Cir. 1990) (quoting Silkwood v. Kerr-
McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 247 (1984». 
202 [d. 
203 [d. 
204 See N. States Power v. Minn., 447 F.2d at 1147. 
205 [d. 
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regulation by creating a comprehensive licensing scheme adminis-
tered by the Atomic Energy Commission, now the Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission.206 That licensing system controlled the production of 
nuclear power and the use of nuclear source and by-product materi-
als.207 Because of the extensive federal regulation of the field, the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit found in North-
ern States Power Co. v. Minnesota that the federal government has exclu-
sive authority under the doctrine of preemption to regulate the con-
struction, operation, and discharge of radioactive effluents of nuclear 
power plants.208 
This holding was subsequently limited somewhat by Pacific Gas & 
Electric Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Development Commis-
sion, decided by the Supreme Court in 1983.209 In that case, the Cali-
fornia State Energy Resources Commission, which had authority over 
the generation and sale of electricity in the state, was responsible for 
enforcing a state law that conditioned the construction of nuclear 
plants on having a means of disposal for nuclear waste.210 Essentially, 
the law imposed a moratorium on the development of new nuclear 
plants in the state until the Commission found that a permanent solu-
tion to disposing of spent fuel rods had been developed and approved 
by the federal government.211 Petitioner Pacific Gas and Electric as-
serted that the state law was invalid under the Supremacy Clause of 
the United States Constitution because it was preempted by the 
Atomic Energy Act that governed the commercial development of 
nuclear power.212 
The Court began its analysis by finding that the Atomic Energy 
Act did not expressly prohibit a state from deciding not to permit the 
2()6 See id. at 1148. 
2Q7Id. 
208 Id. at 1154. The "radioactive effluents" referred to in Northern States Power v. Minne-
sota were not spent-fuel rods but rather radioactive liquid and gaseous discharges. Id. at 
1145. Northern States Power had been permitted by the United States Atomic Energy 
Commission to construct and operate a nuclear power plant. When the utility applied to 
the Minnesota Pollution Control Agency for a waste disposal permit, however, the permit 
was granted subject to substantially more stringent standards than those imposed by fed-
eral law. See id. at 1144-45. The court found that discharge of radioactive effluents was 
inextricably intertwined with the construction and operation of the facility, and were states 
allowed to individually regulate such releases, they could stifle the development of the 
nuclear power industry. Thereby, the states could create an obstacle to the accomplish-
ment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress. See id. at 1154. 
209 461 U.S. 190 (1983). 
210 See id. at 194. 
m See id. at 198. 
212Id. 
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construction of a nuclear plant.213 The Court also discerned that 
there are two distinct aspects of the nuclear waste issue: safety and 
economics.214 Although it was clear that the federal regulations occu-
pied the entire field of nuclear safety, the Court found that the State 
of California could pass laws addressing the economic aspects of nu-
clear power.215 The risk existed that, due to the lack of interim storage 
space or a permanent disposal method for spent fuel, a nuclear plant 
could be forced to shut down.216 The California Commission, in exer-
cising its traditional state responsibility in the field of regulating utili-
ties for determining questions of need, reliability, and cost, could le-
gitimately address the nuclear waste issue insomuch as it affected the 
predictability and economics of electricity generation.217 
In a footnote to the opinion, the Court distinguished the Cali-
fornia law from Minnesota's efforts in Narthern States Power v. Minne-
sota218 to regulate waste discharge issues surrounding nuclear 
plants.219 In Minnesota, the contested regulation fell squarely within 
the field of safety regulation reserved for federal regulation.22o Fur-
ther, although the Court acknowledged that just prior to rendering its 
decision in Pacific Gas & Electric, Congress passed the Nuclear Waste 
Policy Act-thereby providing a complex federal scheme for dispos-
ing of nuclear waste, in the view of the Court the question of eco-
nomic feasibility was not preempted by federal law and remained for 
the states to decide. 221 
The issue of whether the NWPA preempted all state laws restrict-
ing nuclear waste disposal was revisited but not resolved in Nevada v. 
Watkins. 222 In that case, the Nevada legislature passed a law prohibit-
ing the federal government from establishing a nuclear waste reposi-
tory at YUcca Mountain without the state legislature's approval.223 The 
legislature then went further and made it illegal for any person or 
governmental entity to store high-level waste in Nevada.224 These laws 
213 See id. at 205. 
214 See Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 461 U.S. at 196-97. 
215 See id. at 205. 
216 See id. at 196-97. 
217 See id. at 205. 
218 447 F.2d 1143 (8th Cir. 1971), afj'd405 U.S. 1035 (1972). 
219 See Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 461 U.S. at 212, n.24. 
220 Id. 
221 See id. at 219. 
222 See914 F.2d 1545, 1561 (9th Cir. 1990). 
223 See id. at 1550-51. 
224 See id. at 1551. 
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were passed in response to amendments to the NWPA in 1987 that 
designated Yucca Mountain as the sole sight of consideration for a 
federal high-level nuclear waste repository.225 The Federal Circuit 
Court ruled against Nevada, allowing DOE to proceed with its site 
consideration; however, it did so based upon the Property Clause of 
the Constitution226 and it did not reach the question of whether the 
NWPA completely occupied the field of nuclear waste regulation. 227 
This string of cases does not provide a definitive answer as to 
whether a state law that prevents a utility from building additional on-
site storage pending completion of a federal repository would be pre-
empted by the NWPA.228 Prior to constructing additional storage fa-
cilities, a utility must get a license from the Nuclear Regulatory Com-
mission, which clearly brings the issue within the sphere of federal 
regulation and suggests that federal law excludes state restrictions on 
waste storage.229 
The outcome is not clear, however, if a state parsed its law in eco-
nomic terms-restricting the construction of new temporary storage 
out of a concern that a public utility would incur uneconomical, addi-
tional costs as a result of having to provide potentially unlimited 
"temporary" storage for its spent fuel,230 Such a law would closely re-
semble the state law that was upheld by the Supreme Court in Pacific 
Gas & Electric.231 Restricting the ability of a currently-licensed and op-
erating nuclear plant to continue generating power, however, is di-
rectly counter to the holding in Northern States Power v. Minnesota.232 
Further, even in Pacific Gas & Electric, the case that limited the hold-
ing of Northern States Power v. Minnesota, dicta suggests that the Court 
225 See id. at 1550. 
226 The Yucca Mountain site is on federal lands. Congress retains the power to enact 
legislation effecting federal lands pursuant to the Property Clause, and when Congress so 
acts, the federal legislation necessarily overrides conflicting state laws under the Suprem-
acy Clause. See id. at 1554. 
227 See id. at 1561. 
228 See Holt, supra note 28. 
229 See Minn. v. United States Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 602 F.2d 412, 414 (D.C. Cir. 
1979). The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has a general license for on-site dry 
storage that allows any nuclear power plant to install NRC-approved dry storage systems 
without further formal NRC approval. See also Holt, supra note 28. 
230 See id. 
23ISee Pacific Gas & EIRe., 461 U.S. at 197-98. 
232 "[W]e hold that the federal government has exclusive authority under the doctrine 
of pre-emption to regulate the construction and operation of nuclear plants, which neces-
sarily includes regulation of the levels of radioactive effluents discharged from the plant." 
447 F.2d at 1154. 
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saw the NWPA as occupying the entire field of nuclear waste issues 
arising from currently operating reactors.233 
The Northern States Power Company has never challenged the 
Minnesota Radioactive Waste Management Act on constitutional 
grounds.234 Although the above analysis suggests the utility would 
likely be successful, it has accepted the law's authority and sought leg-
islative approval for construction of additional on-site storage.235 This 
may be in part due to the fact that the utility would not want to upset 
the relationship it has with the state legislature or the state public util-
ity commission-a regulatory body which oversees many of the util-
ity's operations and sets the rates it may charge customers.236 So long 
as the commission has such authority over the utility, it is likely that 
the law will go unchallenged. While the utility has been successful so 
far in obtaining approval to expand its storage capacity, going to the 
legislature is an uncertain and expensive process, and is likely to be-
come more so as DOE continues to refuse to accept spent fuel from 
the utility.237 
V. A NEW LEGISLATIVE APPROACH 
In response to increasing state opposition to construction of on-
site, interim storage facilities238 and the refusal of the courts to order 
DOE to begin accepting spent fuel from the utilities,239 an as yet un-
tried legislative fix is likely to be proposed. Assuming utilities are able 
to recover the costs of continued on-site storage through the Court of 
Federal Claims,24o the most pressing problem facing the nuclear 
power industry will likely be the imminent forced shutdown of nu-
clear reactors as they run out of storage space for their spent fue1. 241 
So far, centralized interim storage and "take title" legislation-two 
233 "[I]t is certainly possible to interpret the Act as directed at solving the nuclear waste 
disposal problem for existing reactors without necessarily encouraging or requiring that 
future plant construction be undertaken." 461 U.S. at 220. 
234 See Holt, supra note 28. 
235 See In re Application of N. States Power Co. for Approval of Its 1998 Resource Plan, 604 
NW.2d 386, 387-88 (2000). 
236 See generally, MINN. STAT. § 216B (1999). 
237 See Kriz, supra note 16, at 2543; Holt, supra note 28. 
238 See Kriz, supra note 16, at 2543 (stating that seven nuclear facilities are limited by 
regulations in the amount of waste they can store on-site). 
239 SeeN. States Power Co v. United States Dep't of Energy, 128 F.3d 754,755 (D.C. Cir. 
1997). 
240 See Yankee Atomic Elec. Co. v. United States, 42 Fed. Cl. 223, 225 (Fed. Cl. 1998). 
241 See Holt, supra note 28; Kriz, supra note 16, at 2543. 
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potential solutions to this problem-have yet to garner the necessary 
political consensus to become law.242 As a result, the industry or 
specific individual utilities are likely to attempt a new solution and 
push for narrowly tailored legislation that would unequivocally and 
expressly establish the federal government's exclusive authority over 
the construction of nuclear waste storage facilities. 
The effect of such "exclusive authority" legislation would be to 
preempt state laws restricting the construction of needed, additional 
on-site storage.243 It is well-established that within constitutional limits 
Congress may preempt state authority by so stating in express 
terms.244 The constitutional authority of Congress to regulate over the 
entire spectrum of nuclear energy has long been established.245 States 
may currently regulate the nuclear power industry within a limited 
sphere of traditional state responsibility-out of economic concerns, 
for example.246 The Supreme Court has made clear, however, that 
Congress may limit the states' ability to regulate nuclear energy alto-
gether if the exercise of such power by the states undercuts a federal 
objective.247 
Following enactment of "exclusive authority" legislation, the fed-
eral government-the party responsible for creating the need for ad-
ditional on-site storage-would have unitary authority to allow the 
construction of additional on-site storage facilities. Utilities would be 
no longer be stuck between the federal government's delay and state 
governments' impatience. Utilities would remain responsible for in-
terim, on-site storage, and thus would presumably continue to push 
the federal government to meet its obligation to complete a perma-
nent waste repository.248 The companies would not, however, face the 
eminent shutdown of their reactors because of state opposition to the 
construction of new spent-fuel storage facilities. 249 By making it possi-
ble for utilities to continue to operate their reactors, the government 
242 See Dori Meinert, Senate Effort to Speed Up Nuclear Waste Shipments Declared Dead 'til 
Next Year, COPLEY NEWS SERVICE, Feb. 10, 2000. 
243 See Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 461 U.S. at 203. 
244 [d. 
245 N. States Power v. Minn., 447 F.2d at 1147. 
246 See Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 461 U.S. at 223. 
247 See id. 
248 See Nuclear Waste Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 10131 (a) (5) (giving generators of high-
level waste primary responsibility to provide for, and responsibility to pay the costs of, the 
interim storage of such waste and spent fuel until it is accepted by the Secretary of Energy 
in accordance with the NWPA). 
249 See Holt, supra note 28 (discussing how successful state and local opposition to ex-
panding on-site storage could force reactors to shut down). 
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could limit its liability for consequential damages that might 
otherwise result from the government's failure to meet its obligations 
under the NWPA in a timely manner. 
Certainly, states would resent having their regulatory authority in 
the field reduced and may oppose "exclusive authority" legislation. 
Unlike interim storage legislation, however, it would not require pre-
mature shipping of spent fuel to fucca Mountain, which has thus far 
proven to be politically unachievable.25o Further, unlike "take title" 
legislation, it would not eliminate utilities' incentive to continue to 
press DOE to complete a permanent repository, which is the primary 
concern governors have if utilities are no longer responsible for the 
waste. 251 
CONCLUSION 
The nuclear waste problem would not ultimately be solved by 
"exclusive authority" legislation, but such legislation would prevent 
the problem from being further exasperated. The legislation would 
allow electric utilities to construct needed on-site storage for spent 
nuclear fuel and to continue to operate their reactors. The federal 
government would remain liable for costs incurred by the utilities as a 
result of DOE's failure to meet the NWPA's 1998 deadline. The gov-
ernment would avoid, however, the consequential damages that may 
result if reactors are forced to prematurely shut down because of state 
opposition to additional storage. 
250 See Dori Meinert, Senate Effort to Speed Up Waste Shipments Declared Dead 'til Next Year, 
COPLEY NEWS SERVICE, Feb. 10, 1999. 
251 See Ann Scott Tyson, Congress, Finally, May Act on Nuclear Waste, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE 
MONITOR, Feb. 10, 2000, at 3. 
